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CRITERIA IN WAGE RATE DETERMINATIONS
EDWIN E. WIT'Et
I. WAGE RATE DETERMINATION AND ECONOMIC THEoRY
At the outset let me make it clear that I am not a great expert
on wage rate determination. I will not attempt to answer such
$64 questions as: What percentage of the national income should
go for wages? What is a fair wage for a given occupation?
What effect do wage increases have upon the economy? Or, that
"double or nothing" question: Are the steel workers, the auto-
mobile workers, or the coal miners entitled to a wage increase at
this time and, if so, how much? Neither this economist, nor any
other economist, I believe, can give you an answer to questions
of this sort which can be relied upon as practical guides.
Less than two decades ago, most economists would have had a
ready answer to the basic question, what wage rate should be
paid in a given situation or to a particular group of workers.,
That answer would have been, "the value of the marginal product
produced by labor." Not only was this standard deemed fair and
equitable, but it was looked upon by many as an inescapable law
limiting the return to labor, any departure from which inevitably
would result in reduced employment. Hotly debated was the
-question whether unionism and collective bargaining could raise
the total return to labor above this natural level, with the pre-
ominant view that gains for the organized were made at the
expense of the unorganized.
Even at that time, collective bargaining had many supporters
.among economists. Insofar as they defended their views on
theoretical grounds, these economists claimed for collective bar-
gaining only that it enabled workers to get the full value of their
marginal product, while otherwise they were in danger of ex-
ploitation, often getting less than this standard under individual
bargaining, because they lacked the waiting power of their em-
ployers.
Widely accepted also, although with dissents by some eminent
t Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin.
1. For a good review of wage theory in economic literature in the last
15 years, see Ellis, A Survey of Contemporary Economis (1948) 255-268(written by Lloyd G. Reynolds).
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economists, was the view that normal workers, at the minimum,
were entitled to a living wage, defined in the statutes as a wage
sufficient for complete self-support at standards consistent with
health and decency. The living wage was championed princi-
pally on ethical and moral grounds by its foremost advocate, the
late Msgr. John A. Ryan. 2 But there was also a belief that, from
society's point of view, maintenance of the working force needs
must be a first charge upon industry.
In the last decades the marginal productivity theory of wage
determination has met further challenge on theoretical grounds
from Keynesian economics. This should, perhaps, be called the
present-day orthodox economics in the United States, inasmuch
as it is the accepted economic theory of most of the economists
under 50 years of age, who constitute a majority of all econo-
mists. Not being in that age group, I do not subscribe to all the
Keynesian tenets, but it must be recognized that in their empha-
sis upon the demand side of the supply and demand equation
Lord Keynes and his followers have made an important contri-
bution to economic theory. Applied to wage determination, the
present-day (Keynesian) economics stresses that wages are not
only a cost of production but the source of income of the largest
element in our population. Long before Lord Keynes wrote his
General Theory,3 Henry Ford instituted his $5 per day minimum
wage and proclaimed what became the generally accepted view
of American business in the nineteen twenties, that mass pro-
duction depends upon mass purchasing power. We may not go
to the limits of some Keynesians in regarding high wages as a
means of assuring lasting prosperity, but it is undeniable that
reductions in the total income of the workers are likely to have
deleterious effects upon our economy. That is certain to be the
result unless wages are out of line with other prices or there
are price reductions in the things workers buy equal to the wage
reductions. But unanswered is the question whether increases
in wage rates may not result in such a reduction of employment
as to yield a lesser total income to the workers than a lower
rate.
In the last years there has been greatly increased interest in
2. Ryan, John A., A Living Wage; Its Ethical and Economic Aspects(1906).
3. Keynes, John M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money (1936).
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wage theory among economists. This interest has developed,
particularly among younger economists, many of whom are con-
nected with the institutes of industrial relations or labor-man-
agement centers which have been established in many of our
leading universities. These economists are much better grounded
in economic theory than were the older "labor economists," who
often have been accused by many of their professional brethren
of not being economists at all. The economists who are now
writing on wage theory understand thoroughly both neo-classical
and Keynesian economics. Their approach to wage rate deter-
mination, however, has not been that of deductive reasoning
alone, but they have supplemented such reasoning by observa-
tions in practical situations they have studied. They, moreover,
have not confined their research to the limits of academic eco-
nomics, but have studied situations as a whole and utilized the
contributions to industrial relations made by other social sci-
ences.
I will not attempt to even summarize the contributions to
wage theory made by Reynolds, Dunlop, Ross, Lester and others
of these younger economists. 4 One fact which they have made
very clear concerns the complexity of wage rates. The older
theorists discussed wages in terms of a single rate per hour or
per piece, and often reduced all work to a single category,
4. Among the most noteworthy contributions to wage theory in recent
years are the following: Reynolds, Lloyd G., Labor Economics and Labor
Problems (1949) 319-463; Reynolds, Lloyd G., Toward a Short-Run Theory
of Wages (1948) 38 American Economic Review 289-308; Dunlop, John
T., Wage Determination under Trade Unions (1944); Dunlop, John T.,
Productivity, Income, and Employment in Harris, Seymour E., Income,
Employment, and Public. Policy (1948) 341-362; Ross, Arthur l., Trade
Union Wage Policy (University of California, 1948); Ross, Arthur M.,
The Dynamics of Wage Determinations under Collective Bargaining (1947)
37 American Economic Review 793-822; Lester, Richard A. and Shister,
Joseph, Insights into Labor Issues 197-225 (by Richard A. Lester); Lester,
Richard A., Wage Diversity and its Theoretical Implication (1946) 27
Review of Economic Statistics 152-159; Lester, Richard A., Shortcomings
of Marginal Analysis for Wage-Employment Policies (1946) 36 American
Economic Review 63-82.
In addition to the above writings of younger economists, noteworthy
discussions of wage rate determination in its theoretical aspects written
in the last few years include: Clark, J. M., The Relation of Wages to
Progress in The Conditions of Industrial Progress (University of Penn-
sylvania, 1947) 22-39; Hansen, Alvin H., Perspectives on the Wage-Price
Problem in Wages, Prices, and National Welfare (University of California,
1948) 1-8; Slichter, Sumner H., Basic Criteria Used in Wage Negotiations
(Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, 1947); Taylor, George
W., Can Wages be Left to Collective Bargaining in Wages, Prices, and
National Welfare (University of California, 1948) 32-47.
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"labor." The recent writings have emphasized that there are
many supplements to wages in present day industry: vacation
pay, paid holidays, group insurance, retirement pensions, health
and welfare benefits, sick leave, severance pay, and still others.
There also are many conditions under which pay is either in-
creased or reduced: overtime and penalty rates, premiums for
disagreeable work, shift premiums, travel time, call-in-pay, down
time, clothes changing and wash-up time, clothing allowances,
deductions for breakage or spoiled work, and many others5 A
study of the situation a year ago by Automotive and Aviation
Parts, Inc., the trade association of the automobile parts indus-
try, found that such "fringe benefits" increased wages by an
average of 121/c per hour. The Rhode Island Textile Manufac-
turers' Association reports that fringe benefits added 11%,
nearly 15 cents per hour, to the payroll of its members in Sep-
tember 1948. The calculation of the actual value of these modern
supplements and additions to wage rates is most difficult. Differ-
ent workers appraise these benefits very differently and both
their value and cost vary from time to time. Even most employ-
ers have only vague ideas as to the cost of their employee bene-
fit plans, beyond the amounts currently being paid.
Still another very important contribution in recent years to
a more realistic theory of wage determination has come from
observing how unions act in collective bargaining negotiations.
Unionists do not act as economic men might be expected to act.
Even business unions are very different institutions from cor-
porations and other business enterprises. Unions are not inter-
ested solely, and often not primarily, in the highest possible
return to their members for their work. Survival of the unions
as institutions and their prestige is frequently more important
than the wage rate. Unions and their members do not coolly
calculate what strikes will cost them in lost wages compared
with the wage increase they may hope to gain. As they are
dependent upon the continued support of their members they
must ever satisfy them and under existing conditions of rival
5. The Economic Research Department of the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States in its report, The Hidden Payroll, in May 1949, esti-
mated the non-wage benefits of the typical American worker at $424 per
year or 20.5 cents per hour (15.4 per cent of payrolls). In contrast non-
wage costs averaged only about 1 per cent of the wage bill in 1929.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/5
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unionism must take account of the policies of their rivals, no
less than those of the employers.
Managers, too, are greatly influenced by the opinions and
actions of their fellows. There is extensive resort to a follow-
the-leader policy in wage determination-pattern bargaining as
distinguished from industry-wide bargaining. Further, in their
dealings, at least with individual workers, they are not as tough-
minded economic men as often represented in the textbooks.
In pointing out these realities and still other important aspects
of wage determination neglected by the older economists, the
younger economists who have written recently on wage theory
may be laying the groundwork for a truer and more practical
theory. It cannot be claimed, however, that to date they have
developed such a theory.
For certain analytical purposes, the old marginal productivity
theory of wages still has a good deal of value. Keynesian wage
theory contains an element of truth. The recent work in wage
theory of the younger economists specializing in industrial rela-
tions has not only brought out very clearly the limitations of
the older theories but contains some important suggestions of
value for practical people. But the economists have no ready
answer to the many practical problems of wage rate determina-
tion.
II. ARGUMENT FOR AND AGAINST WAGE INCREASES"
Economic theory. How far the economists are from being able
to answer the practical problems of wage rate determination is
perhaps most clearly indicated by the fact that economic theory
is but seldom presented in arguments made by labor and man-
agement for and against wage rate increases. In all my experi-
ence as an arbitrator and mediator, I have never heard a refer-
ence to the value of the marginal product of the workers. What-
ever may be the value of this concept for analytical purposes,
the fact is that marginal productivity of the workers cannot be
6. Good discussions of the arguments actually used in collective bar-
gaining for and against wage rate increases and the logic behind them
include: Taylor, George W., Criteria in the Wage Bargain in First Annual
Conference on Labor (New York University, 1948) 65-88; Reynolds, Lloyd
G., Labor Economics and Labor Problems (1949) 373-396; Ross, Arthur M.,
Trade Union Wage Policy (University of California, 1948); Slichter,
Sumner H., Basic Criteria Used in Wage Determination (Chicago Asso-
ciation of Commerce and Industry, 1947).
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measured in dollars and cents and, hence, has no meaning at the
collective bargaining table.
The Keynesian theory that high wages are necessary for a
prosperous economy is nowadays often advanced by labor in
appeals for popular support for demands for increases. It also
gets into discussions at the bargaining table but far less im-
portantly, as it is wholly unacceptable to the employers. As a
practical consideration, it encounters the further difficulty that
the theory does not say how high wages should be or whether
present rates should be increased.
On the other hand, employers often refer to the danger seen
by economists that wage increases may result in increased un-
employment. So long as this argument is kept on an abstract
plane, it leaves labor cold and, hence, has little effect. It is only
through clear proof that a demanded wage increase will be ruin-
ous to the particular company that workers or their representa-
tives can be convinced that the incease is not in their own best
interests.
Finally, employers and unions quote economists when their
statements appear to support the position of the side making
the quotation. But I doubt whether the other side is very much
impressed. Instead of discussing wage demands in the terms
used by economists and on the basis of their theories, labor and
management in bargaining negotiations resort principally to
arguments which both sides regard as having at least some
validity.
Cost of Living. On the part of labor, no argument for wage
increases has been more commonly advanced than "that of the
rising cost of living. This results, in part, from the fact that
during the entire period since the unions gained recognition in
the mass production industries, until recently, the cost of living
was advancing. Quite clearly, unless wage rates keep pace with
increases in the costs of living, real wages will decrease.
The strength of the cost of living argument for wage increases
arises, also, from the fact that it is recognized to be a legitimate
argument by employers. When cost of living indexes decline,
employers point to the decrease as a reason for opposing an in-
crease in wage rates and, if large, as a justification for wage
reductions. They also use the cost of living indexes when these
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/5
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indicate that wages have increased more rapidly than has the
cost of living.
But neither unions nor employers generally have been willing
to base wage rates on the cost of living. The unions object to
such a tie because it does no more than to preserve existing
standards. Our entire economy is geared to ever rising stand-
ards of living. So labor is not satisfied with static real wages,
however much it may use the cost of living argument when this
argument serves its purposes. Similarly, employers usually feel
that productivity and the state of business should be given
greater weight in wage rate determination than the cost of liv-
ing.*
This brings me to the General Motors contract of a year ago
which provided for quarterly adjustments in wage rates in ac-
cordance with the fluctuations in the United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics index of consumer prices in large cities.7 This
is the series formerly known as the "consumer price index" and
still is thus referred to popularly. What made this contract pro-
vision acceptable to the United Automobile Workers, C. 1. 0.,
was not only the 11 cents per hour wage increase, which the
company put into effect immediately, but "the improvement
factor," which the union counted on to offset any probable de-
cline in the cost of living. Now that the decline has been greater
than expected, there is a lot of grumbling among the workers
and the rival United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers,
C. I. 0., which accepted the same settlement, is demanding a
limit to possible decreases under the formula.
Productivity. On the part of management the most popular
argument in wage negotiations is that of productivity. Manage-
ment often takes the position that it cannot grant wage increases
because output per worker has declined. As an alternative, it
7. The General Motors contract with the United Automobile Workers,
C. I. 0., entered into for a two year period in the spring of 1948, provides
for a quarterly adjustment of wage rates by 1 cent per hour for each
1.14 point shift in the index of consumer prices of the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics. It also provides for a 3 cents per hour annual
wage increase as an "improvement factor." Under this contract reductions
in wage rates of two and one cent per hour were made in the first year,
but these were offset at the end of the year by the three cents per hour
increase allowed as the "improvment factor." For a criticism of this
contract as a possible basis for wage rate determinations in other indus-
tries, see Reder, M. W., The Significance of the 1948 General Motors
Agreement (1949) 31 Review of Economic Statistics 7-14.
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wants to condition wage increases upon an increase in produc-
tivity.
Labor recognizes that there is a relation between wages and
output. On occasions it uses productivity as an argument for
wage increases, claiming that output has increased and that
wages should go up proportionately. It is unwilling, however,
to accept productivity as the sole criterion for wage adjustments.
The differences on this issue are in keeping with the funda-
mental positions of the respective parties. Management is keenly
aware of the necessity of meeting competition. It must look
upon labor services as a commodity it buys. For survival it
needs must keep its unit costs low. So it insists that increases
in hourly wage rates must be offset by equal or greater increases
in output per hour. The unions, on the other hand, think of
labor primarily, not as labor services, but as members who must
be satisfied. Human beings must live and so costs of living loom
larger in worker thinking than does productivity.
From society's point of view it is obvious that the source of
wages is the value of the production. The only source from
which, at least continued substantial increases in wages can
come is increased production. Increased output, reduced unit
costs, are clearly in the interests of labor no less than of the
employers and of society generally.
Productivity, however, has serious limitations as a yardstick
for determining whether there should be wage increases or how
large they should be. A fundamental difficulty is that of measur-
ing the increase in productivity; another, that of fairly allocating
the increase to the several claimants for shares in the Droduc-
tion.
Difficulties in measuring productivity arise from the mul-
tiplicity and complexity of products and from changes therein,
as well as in methods of production. Attempts to measure pro-
ductivity in terms of the value of the goods produced obviously
must take account of variations in the price level. Physical units
of output, also, are difficult to determine when there are many
processes in production, which seldom remain exactly the same
for long.
On a national basis the most widely accepted estimates of
output per worker in given industries are those of the United
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/5
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States Bureau of Labor Statistics," which are based upon ex-
tensive and costly field surveys. These always relate to some
period in the past and cannot conceivably be entirely up to date.
They have at times been under attack by labor and at other times
from management. A conference called by the Bureau two years
ago which brought together leading research men from both
sides and executives who make use of the Bureau's indexes failed
to develop even approximate agreement on the measurement of
productivity. Through use of committees of technical advisers
from both labor and management and emphasis upon the man
hours going into selected physical units of production, the
Bureau at the moment seems to be reasonably satisfying both
sides with its productivity statistics. Whether this happy situa-
tion will continue should economic conditions change materially
remains to be seen.
The applicability of national statistics on production to par-
ticular wage negotiations is extremely debatable. Economists
who have studied productivity statistics over the years are
pretty well agreed that output per worker over long periods in
the past has increased by about 2 per cent a year. Sumner H.
Slichter believes that, because of the great growth of industrial
research in recent years, there will be a greater average increase
in output per worker in the period immediately ahead than in
the past-probably not less than 2 per cent and perhaps some-
what more.9 But increases in total productivity vary greatly
from year to year and still more from industry to industry. The
use of national statistics of increases in output as guides to per-
missible wage increases in particular companies becomes very
misleading. Output statistics for particular companies, also, but
seldom are entirely satisfactory. Generally they come exclusively
from management and for this reason are suspect by the work-
ers. Clearly, also, they cannot be used as the sole determinant
of wage rates, as this would mean wide variations among plants
in the same industry, even within the same local labor market.
8. Output statistics are published in practically every issue of the
Monthly Labor Review of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and in many
of its Bulletins. They do not, however, cover anywhere near all industries.
Information about these studies can be secured by writing to the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, which is a division of the United States Department
of Labor.
9. View presented in Slichter, Less Spending, Threat to Stability (April
14, 1949) Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
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Output statistics, moreover, do not afford an answer to the
$64 question, who is responsible for variations in output. Be-
cause output in a particular plant has not kept pace with the
national average may or may not be the fault of the workers.
It may be due to the inefficiency of management, the inadequacy
of capital, and a great variety of other reasons beyond the con-
trol of the workers. Or it may be a consequence of slowdowns,
restrictions of production, or the inefficiency or lack of effort of
the workers.
Management is never or but seldom willing to credit labor
with all of the increase in output per worker. Often it argues
that the entire increase is attributable to new machines or pro-
cesses or to additional capital investment. Output does tend to
vary directly with the amount of capital invested per worker.
But increases in output cannot be ascribed solely to the investors.
More competent management, greater intelligence of the work-
ers, and genuine labor-management cooperation in production all
have had a part in the great gains in output per worker in the
United States, which far exceed those of any other country. I
believe that some of the credit, moreover, is to be ascribed to
social factors, such as the accumulated know-how of the Ameri-
can people, our democratic government and our economic sys-
tem of free enterprise. Clearly, there is no generally accepted
formula for equitably allocating savings resulting from in-
creased production, as between consumers and producers, work-
ers, managers, and security holders.
Production is a factor to be taken into account in wage rate
determinations. Normally, all who are connected with a given
industry or dependent upon it are entitled to a share in savings
due to increased output. But productivity does not afford an ex-
clusive or precise measure for wage rate determination.
Ability to Pay. In many respects, closely related to the ques-
tion of productivity is that of ability to pay. When Walter
Reuther advanced ability to pay as the union's principal argu-
ment in support of the Auto Workers' demand for a large wage
increase by General Motors at the end of the war, this produced
a great outcry in management circles. It is my belief that this
outcry was provoked much more by special applications and in-
ferences in Reuther's argument than by a feeling that it is
illegitimate for labor to point to a company's profits as a reason
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/5
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for wage increases. The truth is that unions have always argued
that large profits justify wage increases. Certain it is that
workers instinctively feel that they should to some extent share
in the unusual prosperity of their employer. Employers have
often recognized that this is equitable by distributing a part of
the profits in bonuses. Very generally the most prosperous com-
panies are the highest wage payers and take pride in such a
record.
Employers, on their part, have never hesitated to plead in-
ability to pay as a reason for refusing wage increases or even
as an argument for wage reductions. When convinced that the
claimed inability to pay is genuine, unions often have made con-
cessions to such employers, allowing them lower wage rates than
prevail generally in the industry or locality. Traditionally, both
sides have used the profit and loss statement as an argument in
wage negotiations when it seemed to give support to their posi-
tion. They, moreover, have changed their positions with the
exigencies of different situations. When unions have argued that
high profits justified a wage increase, the employers have said
that ability to pay is immaterial. When employers have argued
inability to pay, the unions have taken the position that this is
immaterial. But both sides have in fact often given weight to
profits and losses in wage rate adjustments.
Neither side, however, is willing to let the profit and loss
statement determine the wage level. To do so would result in
wide differences in wage rates in the same industry and labor
market. It would, moreover, lead to great fluctuations from year
to year. It would often penalize the workers for poor manage-
ment and tend to destroy the rewards of superior management.
Again there is a different approach on the part of labor and
management to this issue, as there is to other considerations
which come up in wage negotiations. Labor looks to the profits
of the last year or of recent years. On the strength of past
profits it argues for wage increases in the future. Manage-
ment is concerned with future costs and expected profits. At
this time, labor points to the large profits of corporations last
year and throughout the post-war period. Management points
to mounting costs and higher break-even points, which are likely
to mean trouble ere long, particularly if economic conditions
should become worse. Generally there is no meeting of minds
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and, hence, little more to ability or inability to pay than an
argument to which the parties, inconsistently, resort when it
strengthens their case.
Comparative Wage Rates. At least until recently, given more
weight than any other argument in wage negotiations are com-
parisons with the rates paid in other establishments, or, where
internal rate structures are at issue, for other similar or related
work in the same plant. Such comparisons are accepted by labor
and management alike to be a legitimate and important con-
sideration in wage rate determination.
Meaningful comparisons, however, are not easy to make. Par-
ticularly for the unions it is difficult to get accurate data on the
wage rates paid in other establishments. Accurate information
can come only from employers and they generally refuse to
reveal this wage data to outsiders, including unions other than
their certified bargaining agents, and sometimes not even to
them. So unions in gathering wage data have had to rely on
information given them by the workers in the plants with which
comparisons are made. Such data is usually full of errors, be-
cause largely based on recollections.
A further great difficulty in wage comparisons between plants
is that jobs, job titles, and job content vary greatly from plant
to plant. It is natural to assume that people with the same job
title do the same work. This, however, is not always or probably
even generally true. Unless the greatest care is exercised to
compare only wages for the same jobs, wage rate comparisons
can be very misleading. The same result is produced if fringe
benefits, supplemental to the wage, are either ignored or im-
properly evaluated.
Very commonly companies and unions cite a considerable
volume of comparative wage rate data in negotiations. Employ-
ers get this data largely from trade asociations or through in-
quiries addressed to other employers. Numerous private services
supply such data to their employer clients, for a fee. Unions
have a smaller number of such services to draw upon but often
get some aid from the research departments of their interna-
tional. All such comparative data is suspect by the other side
and likely to be disputed. Bi-partisan surveys of comparative
wage rates have sometimes been undertaken but only rarely.
The most reliable wage information is that gathered by the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/5
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United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, but this comes prin-
cipally from special studies which are limited to relatively few
industries and cover only key jobs. Most serious is the fact that
the reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics usually are not
published until a year or more after the data has been collected.
Wage statistics published by state labor departments generally
give only averages and are almost unusable in wage negotiations.
What weight to give to comparative wage data is a matter
of judgment. Unions often insist that the workers should be
brought up to the highest rates for given positions paid by any
employer. Only Henry Ford when he first gave a contract to
the Automobile Workers was willing to accept such a standard.
Employers normally will concede only that the general level of
their wages should be on a par with that prevailing in the
industry or community. It has been my observation, also, that
most managements are convinced that their wages are well up
with the general level and it is difficult by comparative statistics
to convince them otherwise.
National Patterns. In recent years, wage increases, to a very
large extent, have followed national patterns established in
major negotiations. These patterns have been easily ascertain-
able and, hence, to a considerable degree have replaced compari-
sons in wage rates as an argument for increases. Aside from
simplicity, however, they have little to commend them. They
have tended to narrow occupational wage differentials and so
have produced dissatisfaction among the skilled workers. They
have also resulted in ignoring the peculiar situations and special
problems of many employers and so have resulted in very un-
equal burdens. They have fostered inter-union competition in
wage rate increases and have facilitated price increases absorb-
ing the entire wage boosts.
The responsibility for the pattern wage adjustments we have
had since the end of World War II, however, cannot be charged
wholly to the labor unions. Many companies, especially sup-
pliers, have refused to do their own negotiating and have held
back in making any wage adjustments until the major com-
panies have concluded their negotiations. Very generally em-
ployers who have made early adjustments have gotten off with
increases below the pattern, but most employers have preferred
to wait until the patterns have been set.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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At that, it needs to be noted that there has been considerable
deviation from the patterns of the first three rounds we have
had since World War I1.10 The pattern of the first round was
the increase of 181 cents per hour first agreed to by the United
States Steel Corporation and promptly followed by all major
steel, automobile, and electrical companies. A survey made by
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics in mid-summer
1946, months after the pattern of an 181/2 cents increase had
been set, however, disclosed that 21% of all employees in manu-
facturing had received no increase whatsoever since the close
of the war; 15% more less than a 10 cents per hour increase;
38%, 10 cents but less than 18 cents; 26%, 181/2 cents or
more. In non-manufacturing industries more than 48% of all
workers had no increase at all and only 2.5% increases of 18 1 2
cents per hour or more. Similarly, the Automotive and Aviation
Parts Manufacturers, Inc., in June 1947 reported that nearly
one-half of its members had made settlements for less than the
15 cents per hour "package" pattern of the second round of
wage increases. Still less was the third round pattern of 11
cents per hour set in 1948 by General Motors slavishly followed
in all industry. At present we are in the so-called "fourth
round" of wage increases. The major companies have not even
begun their negotiations and some of their unions have not yet
formulated or announced their demands. A very large number
of companies, however, have already reached agreements on the
wage rates for the new contract year. These have varied all
over the lot, from no increases whatsoever in textiles and in
many clothing and paper companies, to increases of 25 cents
per hour or more in some building trades settlements. The
National Foremen's Institute, an employer service, has reported
that the average, where increases have been granted, has been
a little less than 10 cents per hour, but it notes that there ap-
pears to be little or no pattern in the settlements.
The net effect of the wage settlements since the close of the
war has been an average increase for most workers considerably
less than the sum of pattern settlements. Coal miners and build-
ing trades employees have gotten increases greater than those
of the pattern settlements, employees in the smaller manufactur-
10. The figures presented in this paragraph are mainly from the article:
Money and Real Earnings During Defense, War, and Reconversion Periods(1947) 64 Monthly Labor Review 983-996.
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ing establishments and in such industries as insurance, tele-
phones, and light and power companies considerably less. In
all manufacturing industries, wage rates increased 43%o from
September 1945, the first month after close of the war, to
October, 1948; hourly earnings, 38%; weekly earnings, 33%.
In the same period the consumer price index for large cities
rose a little less than 35%. The increase in weekly earnings
was a little less than the rise in the consumer price index, but
spendable income was greater, due primarily to the decrease in
taxes. In non-manufacturing industries grouped together, the
increases in wage rates and earnings were relatively greater
than in manufacturing industries, although average earnings
are distinctly lower.1'
It is my belief that patterns set by the major companies are
likely to be a less important factor in wage settlements in the
period immediately ahead than they have been since close of the
war. In an economy of widespread shortage of goods and high
purchasing power, employers have found it an easy matter to
shift wage increases to the consumers. Even marginal firms have
been able to show profits or at least avoid bankruptcy. In such
a situation it was but natural that unions should fairly rigidly
try to hold all employers to the pattern increases and attempt
to get as much of an increase as other unions had won. In the
situation we are in now, where price reductions are far more
common than increases, where most markets have again become
truly competitive, and bankruptcies are rapidly increasing, em-
ployers, particularly in the less prosperous firms, can be counted
upon to resist wage increase much more determinedly than in
the recent past. Unions too, I expect, will make concessions
rather than exacting "their pound of flesh." Workers want wage
increases when they can get them, but they want employment
even more. If they understand the situation they will not con-
sciously force their employers to the wall. As economic con-
ditions become tighter, moreover, the influence of the local
unions in wage determinations is likely to again become greater,
while a boom period is favorable to the development of greater
centralization in unions, no less than in industry.
11. This paragraph is based on the indexes of the United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics. A convenient summary is: The Labor Year in Review(1949) 68 Monthly Labor Review No. 2, particularly at pp. 158-165.
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What It Takes to Effect a Settlement. All criteria for wage
rate determinations which have been discussed are arguments,
which at times are used by one side and at other times by their
opposites, rather than reliable standards which can or should
be followed in all cases. This has led Professor George W.
Taylor, the man who as Vice Chairman and later Chairman of
the National War Labor Board had more to do with the develop-
ment of the wage stabilization policy of wartime than anybody
else, and who has had wide experience as a labor arbitrator, to
suggest that the best criterion for wage determinations is "what
it takes to settle a strike or prevent a strike. ''12 This standard
brings in all of the other criteria suggested, as well as still
others. How much weight is to l;e given to any of them will
vary with the time and situation.
One important element in the logic of such a standard is that
strikes are generally much more costly than the resulting gains
to either side. The dollar and cents cost of strikes, of course,
is not the only consideration of the parties when, as so often
happens in the last minutes of bargaining negotiations, they
must decide whether they would rather take the costs of a strike
or make the concession which would prevent or settle a strike.
Both sides, at times, deem other matters more important than
the economic costs. But people who have had experience with
strikes know that they involve great costs and risks, which it is
generally preferable to avoid, if possible.
Further, such a criterion squares well with a policy of free
collective bargaining. In recent years all groups in labor and
management have acclaimed free and unrestricted collective bar-
gaining. Encouragement of collective bargaining, moreover, is
our national policy, even under the Taft-Hartley Act. 2 Nearly
everybody at least professes that he wants the government to
stay out of labor relations, as much as possible. In relation to
wage determination that means a free hand to the parties to
arrive at settlements as best they can.
12. Developed by Professor Taylor in: Can Wages be Left to Collective
Bargaining in Wages, Prices and National Welfare (University of Cali-
fornia, 1948) 32-47, and in his Labor-Management Relations in the Days
Ahead (University of Wisconsin Industrial Relations Center, 1948).
12a. Labor Management Relations Act (1947) 61 Stat. 136, c. 120, 29
U. S. C. A. §§141-144, 151-167, 171-182, 185-188, 191-197, Title 50 App.§1509.
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The Public Interest. Wage rate determination on this basis
presents some difficulties and dangers. One of these is inequality
of bargaining power. When one of the bargainers has over-
whelming power, an unfair bargain is likely to result. Another
danger when wage determination is left to free collective bar-
gaining is the possibility of collusion between the parties. Col-
lusion results in higher prices to consumers than they would
otherwise have to pay.
That these dangers exist cannot be said. Collective bargain-
ing functions best when there is something like equality of bar-
gaining power. While that situation cannot be said to exist in
all industries, we probably are closer to equality of bargaining
-power between management and labor today than earlier in our
history. The assets and income of our largest unions are far
less than those of our large corporations but through their hold
upon the loyalties of many thousands of workers they have at-
tained a withholding power as great as that of management. In
some industries, the shoe is now on the other foot. Small em-
ployers often are not a match for the unions with which they
must deal. Through associational bargaining, however, they
-can offset the advantages combination gives the workers. In an
economy of free enterprise, moreover, abuse of power tends to
correct itself ere long.
The danger of possible collusion between management and
labor at the expense of the consumers has given much concern
to many theoretical economists. The public generally and, I
think, more realistically has been much more worried about
failure of the parties to agree than about the dangers of col-
lusive agreements. Strikes have been far more costly to con-
.sumers than all collusive wage agreements.
There have been some collusive agreements which have re-
sulted in the public's having to pay more than it should for some
goods and services. These have been principally in small seg-
-ments of the economy and especially in industries where labor
costs are but a small part of the total costs. When unions agree
with businessmen to rig prices they are now subject to prosecu-
tion under the anti-trust laws. If these laws are not adequate
to reach all types of collusive agreements, they should be
.strengthened. But to me the costs and risks of allowing the
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parties a free hand in wage determinations seem to be far less
than those involved in governmental control.
Nor is the fact that wage increase have often been followed
by equal or greater price increases a valid argument against
wage rate determination through free collective bargaining.
Wages are a cost of production which in the long run will be
reflected in prices except as offset by increased productivity.
But there are many other cost of production besides wage costs;
moreover, "competition, business policy, and public policy all
add to or subtract from the cost figures to produce selling prices,
which individually show widely varying relationships to costs."'
Wage increases were not the sole nor the basic cause for the
great increase in prices which followed the close of the war and
the abandonment of price controls. As Alvin Hansen has de-
veloped, the basic causes were "world wide scarcity of food, the
overall excess of aggregate demand in relation to the available
supply of commodities," the wartime consumer savings, and the
temporarily very great "demand for construction, productive
equipment, and inventory accumulation."'1 3 Because these tem-
porary post-war conditions have all changed, we are now at a
stage where wage increase are likely to have very different ef-
fects than they have had in the recent past. It is because
employers now cannot readily pass wage increases on to the
consumers, that such increases are going to prove a good deal
more difficult than they have been.
There is much to be said for an economy, such as we have
had in the past, in which the fruits of increased productivity
have largely gone to the active producers as wage increases and
higher pay for management, rather than to non-active con-
sumers in the form of price decreases. Wages can increase too,
fast to maintain a stable economy. But wage increases stimu-
late technological progress, which is the cornerstone in the
American way of attaining ever rising standards of living for
all our people.
In weighing the advisability of the policy of allowing the
parties a free hand in determining wage rates through collective
bargaining, possible alternatives must be considered. There
13. Perspectives on the Wage-Price Policy, in Wages, Prices, and the
Public Welfare (University of California Institute of Industrial Relations,.
1948) 1-8.
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seem to me to be only two basic alternatives, arbitration and
governmental wage rate determination.
I believe in voluntary arbitration. Every dispute arising while
the contract is in effect over the meaning and interpretation of
its provisions which the parties cannot resolve between them-
selves should be settled by arbitration. I hold the view also that
generally arbitration is preferable to strikes when the parties
cannot agree on contract terms. But the results of arbitration
seldom are as acceptable to the parties as are agreements ar-
rived at directly by them.
When arbitration is imposed, rather than agreed upon be-
tween the parties, the results are likely to be even less satisfac-
tory. When collective bargaining fails in critical situations, the
government may have to dictate the terms of settlement. But
governmental determination of wage rates is inconsistent With
an economy of free enterprise. Whatever may be the short-
comings of wage rate determination through free collective bar-
gaining, it is vastly preferable to any practical alternatives, as
least so long as it normally results in settlements without too
many strikes.
The Present Situation. Concluding, let me make these few
comments about the present situation. Major contract negotia-
tions, affecting pattern setting companies, are about to begin.
Labor is demanding large wage increases, plus costly "fringe
benefits" in the form of retirement pensions, and health and
welfare funds, or increases in such benefits. There is a wide-
spread belief that labor is making the wage demands largely
as trading stock to gain the employee benefits it seeks for its
members.
At the moment, it is not certain whether employers regard
the demanded wage increases or the employee benefits with
greater concern. Far more than they have been, they are now
conscious of the costs of employee benefits. They also realize
that once they become partners with the unions in providing
employee benefits their costs are almost certain to increase with
the lapse of time. Further they are becoming aware that union-
sponsored employee benefit programs, even if jointly managed
or administered by an insurance company, will attach the work-
ers more irrevocably to the unions than ever before.14
14. Some of the problems arising out of joint pension, health and
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But the employers are in a weak position, at least logically,
to resist the union demands. They have established very ade-
quate pension systems for their executives and many other
benefits much more liberal than are now being sought for the
production workers. They have resisted more adequate social
security benefits. In this day and age economic protection must
be afforded for the growing number of our older people, as well
as in cases of unemployment or prolonged sickness. At the pres-
ent time such protection can be provided either through con-
tributory social insurance systems through employee benefit
plans financed largely by the employers, or ever increasing relief
expenditures. Either a reversal of employers' attitude on social
security or the concessions on the unions' demands for employee
benefits would seem to be called for.
But as I have developed, logic is not necessarily determining
in wage negotiations. Your guess as to what will happen is as
good as mine. It is clear only that we have come to a major
turning point in wage rate determination.
welfare plans were discussed by the author in his address on "Trends in
Payment for Medical Care" at the Midwinter Personnel Conference of the
American Management Association, at Chicago, February 1949. This ad-
dress has been published by the American Management Association, in its
What's Ahead in Employee Health and Pension Planning (Personnel Series
No. 126), 25-33.
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